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This article adds technology choice to a free-entry Cournot model with linear
demand and constant marginal costs. Firms can choose from a discrete set of
technologies. This simple framework yields non-existence of equilibrium, exis-
tence of multiple equilibria and equilibria in which ex-ante identical ﬂrms choose
diﬁerent technologies as possible outcomes. I provide a full characterization of
the parameter sets for which these outcomes arise. The (non-)existence problem
disappears if vertical market size is large. Non-existence is largely a ’small num-
ber’ phenomenon. Asymmetric equilibria emerge either because of indivisibilities
or due to similarity of diﬁerent technologies in terms of the average costs realized.
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Existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium are topics of a long and ongoing de-
bate.1 The problem is that even for well-behaved preferences, ’examples of duopoly
models in which no Cournot equilibrium (in pure strategies) exist are easily produced’
(Vives, 1999, p. 94). Typically, the approaches dealing with existence start from a
given number of ﬂrms. They consider the quantity setting game, taking as given tech-
nologies, i.e. the cost functions. While ﬂrms may diﬁer, these diﬁerences are usually
given exogenously (see, for instance, Novshek, 1985). From an Industrial Organization
perspective it is interesting to know whether and under what conditions both market
structure and technology can be endogenized without running into existence problems.
Is it easily possible to add an additional stage which deals with entry and technology
choice?2
From the above quote as well as from the well-known problem of non-existence of a
pure strategy equilibrium in research tournaments without uncertainty (see Dasgupta
and Stiglitz, 1980a), one might conclude that the non-existence problem becomes even
more severe. I assess how important the problem is by analyzing the simple and
standard case of linear demand and constant marginal costs. As regards technology
choice, I assume that ﬂrms can choose from a set of two technologies, a large-scale and
a small-scale technology.
This simple framework is quite rich in terms of the patterns of existence and unique-
ness of (pure strategy) equilibrium it yields. Non-existence of equilibrium, existence
of multiple equilibria and equilibria in which ex-ante identical ﬂrms choose diﬁerent
technologies are possible outcomes depending on the parameters. I provide a full char-
acterization of the parameter sets for which these outcomes arise.
There are two main ﬂndings with respect to non-existence of equilibrium: First, the
1See the recent article by Long and Soubeyran (2000) for a list of contributions.
2Long and Soubeyran (2000) claim that an advantage of their approach is that the equilibrium is
characterized in terms of marginal costs. According to these authors, this facilitates the study of a
class of two-stage Cournot games (see p. 345).
1existence problem disappears if vertical market size is larger than a certain threshold.
Vertical market size is measured here by the vertical intercept of the demand curve.
Second, non-existence is largely a ’small number’ phenomenon. One may well construct
examples for which an equilibrium fails to exist for arbitrarily large numbers of ﬂrms.
However, the range of parameter values where non-existence may occur is large only
if the market supports only a few large-scale ﬂrms. This result is quite important in
the light of the wide-spread use of duopoly models. An interesting example is a recent
paper by Mills and Smith (1996). In a Cournot duopoly model with technology choice,
Mills and Smith characterize conditions under which ex-ante identical ﬂrms choose
diﬁerent technologies. My results show that the characterization is incomplete as long
as entry is not explicitly accounted for. The article also derives a condition, which
provides an easy check for the existence of equilibrium.
Concerning uniqueness of equilibrium I characterize the market size range in which
multiple equilibria are likely to exist. It turns out that multiplicity of equilibrium
requires that the diﬁerent types of ﬂrms do not diﬁer much in terms of the average
costs realized in an equilibrium in which only one technology is available. Consequently
the performance, i.e., prices and market output, of very diﬁerent industry structures
may be almost identical, a point also made by Davis (1999).
A ﬂnal topic addressed in this article concerns the question under what conditions
ex-ante identical potential entrants end up employing diﬁerent technologies. I derive
a su–cient condition for a symmetric equilibrium to exist in which all ﬂrms choose
the same technology. From an empirical point of view, the most interesting parame-
ter values seem to be those for which this su–cient condition does not hold. In the
respective range a heterogeneous industry structure arises endogenously. The article
shows that the results of Mills and Smith (1996) generalize even to the case of free
entry. My model provides an endogenous explanation of the diﬁerences in ﬂrm size
frequently found in many industries (see, e.g., Sutton, 1998) within a framework of
technology choice. By explicitly allowing for heterogeneity, it diﬁers from the main
2body of the literature on technology choice and R&D activities, respectively, under
Cournot competition. In that literature, most authors either directly assume that a
unique and symmetric equilibrium exists (see, e.g., Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura,
1993) or they ensure existence of such an equilibrium by making strong assumptions
on the - typically continuous - set of available technologies (see, e.g., Dasgupta and
Stiglitz, 1980b). Consequently, these models cannot account for heterogeneity among
ﬂrms by assumption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the ba-
sic model and introduce entry. Section 4 derives a su–cient condition for a unique and
symmetric equilibrium to exist. Section 5 discusses non-existence of equilibrium, co-
existence of diﬁerent types of ﬂrms in equilibrium and non-uniqueness of equilibrium. It
proves that non-existence vanishes for large values of vertical market size and presents
an example on the importance of non-existence. The example also demonstrates for
which parameter values both asymmetric and multiple equilibria arise. Section 6 con-
cludes.
2 The model






where p and y respectively denote the price and the aggregate demand of the product.
The demand function exhibits two market size parameters, a and s. The parameter a
accounts for what I call vertical market size. It measures the maximum willingness to
pay for that product. The parameter s is a measure of horizontal market size. One
can think of it as the number of (identical) consumers. Firms may choose from a set
of two technologies, a small- and a large-scale technology. The constant marginal costs
associated with the small-scale technology are c>0. Firms entering with the small-
3scale technology incur ﬂxed costs fS. The marginal costs for large-scale producers are
zero. Their ﬂxed costs are denoted as fL.O fc o u r s e ,fL >f S. The overall number of
(active) ﬂrms is denoted by n, m describes the number of small-scale (or S-)ﬂrms and
n ¡ m the number of large-scale (or L-)ﬂrms.
Firms’ proﬂts depend on the technology they have chosen. The proﬂt functions are:




)yj ¡ cyj ¡ fS;j 2 M (2)




)yi ¡ fL;i 2 N n M; (3)
where yk is the output of ﬂrm k =1 ;:::;n. M is the set of S-ﬂrms and N := f1;:::;ng.
The equilibrium quantity of an S-ﬂrm is
yS(m;n)=
s(a ¡ c ¡ (n ¡ m)c)
n +1
8m =1 ;:::;n: (4)




8m =0 ;:::;n¡ 1: (5)
Substituting yl and yh into (2) and (3) leads to equilibrium proﬂts of S and L ﬂrms as
a function of the respective ﬂrm numbers:
ƒS(m;n)=
s
(n +1 ) 2(a ¡ c ¡ (n ¡ m)c)




(n +1 ) 2(a + mc)
2 ¡ fL 8m =0 ;:::;n¡ 1: (7)
3E n t r y
Suppose entry into the market is free, and a large number of identical potential entrants
exists. A potential ﬂrm can enter as an S-ﬂrm or an L-ﬂrm. In a free-entry-equilibrium
(m;n) the zero-proﬂt conditions
ƒS(m +1 ;n+1 )< 0 • ƒS(m;n)( 8 )
4and
ƒL(m;n +1 )< 0 • ƒL(m;n)( 9 )
must hold.
Deﬂnition 1 A candidate equilibrium is a conﬂguration (m;n) that satisﬂes the zero-
proﬂt conditions (8) and (9).
A candidate equilibrium is of some interest on its own. It constitutes the equilibrium
of a game with a large population of potential entrants of two diﬁerent types. The
types, i.e. the technology of the respective ﬂrms, are exogenous.
In our model with technology choice, an equilibrium conﬂguration (m;n)m u s t
additionally satisfy the no-switching conditions
ƒS(m;n) ‚ ƒL(m ¡ 1;n) (10)
and
ƒL(m;n) ‚ ƒS(m +1 ;n): (11)
S-ﬂrms must not have an incentive to employ the L-technology, and L-ﬂrms must not
have an incentive to employ the S-technology.
As the above description makes clear, I consider a two-stage game. In stage 1, ﬂrms
decide on entry and technology. In the second stage, ﬂrms choose their output levels.
Each equilibrium of the game with endogenous technology is, of course, an equilibrium
of a game with exogenous technologies and given types. Therefore, the equilibria of
the endogenous technology case also indicate possible equilibrium conﬂgurations for an
environment with exogenous heterogeneity, i.e. ex-ante heterogeneity.
4 Existence of a unique and symmetric equilibrium
In this section I provide a su–cient condition for a unique equilibrium to exist in which
all active ﬂrms choose the same technology. I call such an equilibrium symmetric. The
derivation of the condition ﬂrst proceeds in a graphical way, before it is stated and
5proved in more formal terms. The graphical analysis provides some intuition for the
requirements of a symmetric equilibrium.
Let TS = c+
q
fS=s and TL =
q
fL=s. TS and TL denote the average costs realized
by an L-ﬂrm and an S-ﬂrm, respectively, in a free entry equilibrium in which only
the respective technology is used.3 TL = TS is clearly a knife-edge case. The relation
between TS and TL determines which of the two technologies is, roughly speaking, the
e–cient one.
For the graphical analysis I display the equations ƒS(m;n)=0a n dƒ L(m;n)=0
in (n;m)-space.4 Using equation (6), ƒS(m;n) = 0 yields m = n(TS=c)+( TS ¡ a)=c.
Using equation (7), ƒL(m;n) = 0 yields m = n(TL=c)+( TL ¡ a)=c. The two lines
intersect at (n;m)=( ¡1;¡a=c). Figure 1 depicts the two lines for TS >T L.T h e y
intersect the horizontal axis at ¡1+a=TS and ¡1+a=TL, respectively. Note that the
lines have a positive slope greater than 1.5 Proﬂts can be kept constant with increasing
n if m, the number of small ﬂrms, increases faster than n. Proﬂts of the respective
ﬂrm types are negative in the area below the respective zero-proﬂt line.
Figure 1 about here
Given the conﬂguration in Figure 1 both technologies cannot coexist in equilibrium.
To see this, note that the use of technology S by some ﬂrms would require a conﬂg-
uration (m;n)o no ra b o v et h el o c u sƒ S(m;n)=0 . O t h e r w i s eS-type ﬂrms would
make losses. However, with this conﬂguration, entry would be proﬂtable for large-scale
ﬂrms. This can be seen from the conﬂguration at the starting point of the horizontal
arrow in Figure 1. Entry of an L-ﬂrm implies that the conﬂguration (m;n)c h a n g e si n
the direction of this arrow. It immediately follows that at least one ﬂrm could enter
using the L-technology provided that the horizontal distance between the two lines at
3Average cost are calculated here neglecting the integer constraint.
4The following derivation ignores the integer constraint. It is taken into account in the formal
derivation below.
5The slope of locus ƒL(m;n) = 0 is smaller than one if c>T L. In this case the reduced proﬂt
function derived in equation (7) does not apply, as it would require negative output of small ﬂrms.
6the respective value of m is greater than 1. The resulting conﬂguration (m;n +1)i m -
plies positive proﬂts for the entrant. A su–cient condition for the horizontal distance
between the two lines to always be greater than one is that the distance at m =0i s
greater than one. For future purposes I denote the respective expression as D.T h u s ,
D · (a=TL)¡(a=TS). In a sense, D gives a measure of the cost diﬁerence between the
two technologies.
The above discussion shows that in equilibrium S- t y p eﬂ r m sc a n n o tb ea c t i v e .T o
see that only L ﬂrms are active is indeed an equilibrium look at the vertical arrow in
Figure 1. It starts at (n;m)=( ¡1+a=TL;0), i.e., at the free entry number of L-type
ﬂrms if only this technology is used. For this conﬂguration to be an equilibrium an
L-type ﬂrm must not have an incentive to switch to the S-technology. Again, the arrow
indicates in which direction the industry conﬂguration would change in this case. If the
vertical distance between the two lines for n = ¡1+a=TL is greater than 1 such a move
cannot be proﬂtable. To see this, note that the resulting conﬂguration (1;n) would lie
below the zero-proﬂt line for S-technology ﬂrms. Again, the assumption D>1 together
with the fact that the slope of ƒS(m;n) = 0 is greater than the slope of ƒL(m;n)=0
guarantees that the (vertical) distance is greater than 1. This establishes the existence
of a symmetric equilibrium with only L- t y p eﬂ r m s . T h ec o n d i t i o no nD shows what
it takes in terms of a cost disadvantage in order to keep ’ine–cient’ ﬂrms out of the
market. This is equivalent to guaranteeing the existence of a unique and symmetric
equilibrium.
Uniqueness and symmetry of equilibrium requires much less in terms of the cost
diﬁerence if TS • TL. For the respective parameter values only S-type ﬂrms can be
active in equilibrium. To see this, consider the knife-edge case TS = TL. In this case the
zero-proﬂt curves coincide. Consequently, L type ﬂrms cannot be active in equilibrium.
This follows from the fact that proﬂts of all ﬂrms inclusive of the switching ﬂrm increase
as soon as an L-type ﬂrm switches to the S-technology. Starting from a situation of zero
proﬂts it is always proﬂtable for a large ﬂrm to switch to the small-scale technology.
7Irrespective of what the number of L-ﬂrms is in the candidate equilibrium given n,
deviation is a dominant strategy. The equilibrium is reached when only S-ﬂrms are
active. Neither switching nor entry would be proﬂtable. Switching to a large-scale
technology given the total number of ﬂrms depresses proﬂts of all ﬂrms inclusive of the
switching ﬂrm. Further entry is not possible by construction of the zero-proﬂt curves.
The graphical analysis reveals an important diﬁerence between the cases with en-
dogenous and exogenous technology, respectively. With exogenous technology the
condition TS • TL is insu–cient to guarantee that the ’ine–cient’ technology, the
L-technology, is not employed in equilibrium.6 Consider again the knife-edge case
TS = TL. With exogenous technology only large ﬂrms are active is an equilibrium.
The entry of neither large nor small ﬂrms is possible. Starting from a situation when
only large ﬂrms are active, entry of a small ﬂrm would lead to a movement along an
arrow with slope 1. As the slope of locus ƒS(m;n) = 0 is greater than 1, a small
entrant cannot break even. With exogenous heterogeneity, uniqueness of equilibrium
requires a su–cient distance between the two loci in the case TS • TL as well. Only if
the cost advantage of the ’e–cient’ technology, the S-technology, is su–ciently large,
only large ﬂrms are active cannot be an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 states and proves the results for the endogenous technology case in
more formal terms. It also takes the integer constraint into account. Therefore the
value of D which is su–cient for existence and symmetry is greater than in Figure 1.
Proposition 1 If D ‚ 2, a unique equilibrium exists and in equilibrium all ﬂrms use
the L-technology. If TS • TL, a unique equilibrium exists and in equilibrium all ﬂrms
use the S-technology.
Proof see Appendix.
Having derived the conditions under which a unique and symmetric equilibrium
exists, I now further discuss the meaning of these conditions and how diﬁerent vari-
6Note that only small ﬂrms are active is an equilibrium anyway as it is the equilibrium in the
endogenous technology case.
8ables aﬁect them. A closely related question is how technology choice depends on the
parameters in general. The graphical analysis and Proposition 1 reveal an asymmetry
between the case where the S-technology and that where the L-technology is the ef-
ﬂcient one. If the small-scale technology is e–cient, the result obtained is similar to
that of models with a continuum of ﬂrms (see Elberfeld and G˜ otz, 2002). Only the
e–cient technology is employed in equilibrium.7 If the L-technology is the e–cient one
the results diﬁer from, for instance, a model of perfect competition with a continuum
of ﬂrms. In our oligopoly model with large agents even ’ine–cient’ ﬂrms may be viable
in the long run, if the cost diﬁerence is not too large.
The two market size parameters a and s have quite diﬁerent eﬁects as far as the
two questions are concerned. Vertical market size a does not aﬁect technology choice
as it does not enter TS or TL.G i v e n t h a t TS >T L, there is a monotonic relation
between a and D.I n c r e a s i n ga makes it ever more likely that a symmetric equilibrium
exists. Horizontal market size s has a clear impact on technology choice. Increasing s
eventually makes the large-scale technology superior. It is with respect to horizontal
market size that the statement holds that large markets give rise to the use of large-
scale technologies. Symmetric equilibria exist for small and for large values of s but
not for intermediate values. In the limit, as either a or s approach inﬂnity, a unique
and symmetric equilibrium exists. Large vertical market size does not determine which
technology is used. This property of the linear demand model has also been documented
by Neumann et al. (2001). They show that changes in the parameter a leave ﬂrm size
and ﬂrm R&D expenditures constant. Only the number of ﬂrms changes with a.
The cost parameters aﬁect technology choice in the way one would expect. If either
marginal or ﬂxed costs of a technology decrease it is more likely that the respective
technology is used. A change in a cost parameter that increases the diﬁerences in
average costs makes existence of a unique and symmetric equilibrium more likely.
7Note that one obtains a unique equilibrium even for the knife-edge case TL = TS.T h i si st h eo n l y
case in which equilibrium is not unique in a framework with a continuum of ﬂrms!
9Before turning to the question of what happens if the su–cient condition of Propo-
sition 1 is not satisﬂed, I extend Proposition 1 to the case of k diﬁerent technologies.
F o rt h a tp u r p o s eIe x t e n dt h ea b o v en o t a t i o ni nas t r a i g h t f o r w a r dw a y .S u p p o s et e c h -
nology type t,w h e r et =1 ;:::;k,h a sﬂ x e dc o s t sft and (constant) marginal costs ct.
Let Tt = ct+
q
ft=s.A g a i n ,Tt denotes average costs in the free-entry equilibrium with
technology t.D e ﬂ n e Ti = minfT1;:::;T kg, Tj = minfT1;:::;T i ¡ 1;T i +1 ;:::;T kg
and Dt · a=Ti ¡ (a=Tt)f o ra l lt =1 ;:::;k;t6 = i.
Proposition 2 If Dj ‚ 2, then an equilibrium exists and in equilibrium all ﬂrms use
technology Ti.
Proof Note that Dj <D t for all t =1 ;:::;k;t6 = i;j by deﬂnition. The Proposition
then follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 1. By the assumption on Dj a
deviation to technologies with greater marginal costs and smaller ﬂxed costs cannot be
proﬂtable. Taking into account that Dj ‚ 2 implies Ti <T t for all t =1 ;:::;k;t6 = i,
technologies with lower marginal but higher ﬂxed costs cannot be proﬂtable either. 2
The condition employed in Proposition 2 is more restrictive than the respective
condition of Proposition 1. The main purpose of Proposition 2 is to show that the
above arguments easily extend to more general cases. Two consequences of Proposition
2 are worth mentioning. First, technology choice and therefore industry structure may
change quite often as a function of horizontal market size s. Of course, this requires
that the various technologies are important in the sense that they provide the minimum
average costs for some values of s. Second, the range for which the su–cient conditions
for existence of a unique and symmetric equilibrium does not hold increases if more
technologies exist. Thus, it is even more important in the case with k technologies to
examine what happens if the su–cient condition is not satisﬂed. I turn to this in the
next section. The analysis will be constrained to the case of two technologies, which
as above are labeled L-a n dS-technology.
105 Non-existence, non-uniqueness, and asymmetry
of equilibrium
In this section I examine the outcomes in the range where the su–cient condition is
not satisﬂed. The result that is probably the most interesting one from a theoretical
and methodological view concerns the non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for
certain parameter ranges. From an empirical point of view, the asymmetric equilib-
ria arising in large part of the range where the su–cient condition does not hold, are
well worth mentioning. They reproduce the heterogeneous structures found in many
industries (see, e.g., Sutton 1998). In the relevant range ex-ante identical ﬂrms end
up with diﬁerent amounts of output. Thus, one obtains an endogenous explanation of
ﬂrm size diﬁerences leading to an asymmetric industry structure. The ﬂnal outcome I
shall discuss concerns uniqueness of equilibrium. Examples show that one often obtains
multiple equilibria in the range considered in this section. This is particularly true if
the candidate equilibria involve several large ﬂrms. The interesting thing about these
equilibria is that industry performance measured by the equilibrium price is approx-
imately the same in the diﬁerent equilibria while the implied industry conﬂgurations
may be quite diﬁerent.
In the following subsections, I examine the three possible outcomes in some detail.
The analysis proceeds mainly by means of examples. After excluding the range for
which general results are easy to derive, general results are hardly possible. There is
one important exception, however, as far as non-existence is concerned. In the next
subsection I show that an equilibrium always exists if vertical market size a is greater
than some threshold value.
5.1 Non-existence of equilibrium
The intuition as to why non-existence arises is straightforward: As long as many rivals
are active, the pivotal ﬂrm chooses the large-scale technology. Given this level of
investment, (some) rivals do not have an incentive to enter in the ﬂrst place. However,
11if there are less rivals, it is optimal for the pivotal ﬂrm to switch to the small-scale
technology. Put in the terms of Figure 1, the scenario might appear as follows. Suppose
that the candidate equilibrium is one with only large ﬂrms and that the respective
number of large ﬂrms is „ n. An equilibrium may not exist if the vertical distance
between the two zero-proﬂt lines is so small that a ﬂrm which switches the technology
and moves along the vertical arrow, ends up making a positive proﬂt with the S-
technology.8 At the new industry conﬂguration entry of either S or L-type ﬂrms may
be possible. If S-ﬂrms enter both the horizontal and the vertical distance between
the zero-proﬂt lines is greater than in the only large ﬂrm case. Therefore, it is well
likely that either additional entry of a large ﬂrm becomes proﬂtable or that a small
ﬂrm could increase its proﬂt by switching technologies. Both in these situations and
in the case where entry with the L-technology becomes proﬂtable once an ’incumbent’
switches, the resulting conﬂguration is one with „ n large ﬂrms and (at least) one small
ﬂrm. Due to the assumption that only large ﬂrms are active constitutes a candidate
equilibrium, we know that the small ﬂrm cannot be viable. Once it exits, we are back
at the situation in which switching technologies becomes proﬂtable for one large ﬂrm.
An equilibrium does not exist.
In the following I ﬂrst present an example of non-existence, which illustrates how
important non-existence is in terms of the range of parameter values for which non-
existence occurs. Second, I show that non-existence does not arise for ’large’ values of
vertical market size a. I also discuss the parameters which determine how large a must
be in order to guarantee existence.
The example depicts the regions in the (a;s)-space where non-existence applies.
The parameter values I use are: fS =5 ;c=2 ;f L = 2050. The values of the ﬂxed costs
are chosen such that the maximum number of large ﬂrms, for which non-existence can
arise, equals 20. It is explained below how this number is derived. Figure 2 depicts
necessary conditions for non-existence. The triangular-shaped areas are the areas where
8The vertical distance at n =( a=TL) ¡ 1 must be smaller than 1.
12non-existence may occur. The respective candidate equilibrium starts with one large
ﬂrm for values of a of about 4 (the largest ’triangle’) and ends with 19 large ﬂrms for
values of a around 40 (the respective area looks more like a dot in the diagram). In all
’triangles’ there are (a;s) vectors for which non-existence arises.9
Figures 2 and 3 about here
The conditions are explained in more detail by describing Figure 3, which provides a
detail of Figure 2. Figure 3 depicts the area of non-existence for the case where the
candidate equilibrium is one with one large ﬂrm.
Locus s1 gives the value of s such that the large ﬂrm (or one of the „ n large ﬂrms,
respectively) is indiﬁerent between the two technologies, given the ﬂrm is the sole
incumbent (given there are „ n large incumbents). Thus, s1 is derived from the condition
ƒS(1; „ n)=ƒ L(0; „ n), which yields
s1 =
(1 + „ n)
2 (fL ¡ fS)
2ac„ n ¡ c2 „ n2 : (12)
Below locus s1, the ﬂrm would switch to the small-scale technology. As explained
above, such a switch may cause non-existence as entry of either large or small ﬂrms
might become possible.
Locus A gives the value of s, such that a large ﬂrm is viable („ n large ﬂrms are
viable). It solves the equation ƒL(0; „ n)=0 .L o c u sA captures the notion of a candidate
equilibrium with „ n large ﬂrms.
Locus C captures the constraint ’only small ﬂrms are active’. It solves the condition
ƒS(n⁄;n ⁄)=ƒ L(n⁄ ¡1;n ⁄), where n⁄ denotes the zero proﬂt number of small ﬂrms in
an ’only small ﬂrms are active’ equilibrium. For values of s above locus C deviating
f r o mt h ec h o i c eo ft h eS-technology is always proﬂtable for a single ﬂrm.
The emergence of non-existence in the area between s1a n dC is straightforward.
Below locus s1 ’one large ﬂrm is active’ is not an equilibrium, since the ﬂrm would have
9Non-existence occurs, for instance, for (a;s)=( 4 0 :079;510:587). The free entry number of ﬂrms in
the case where only the L-(S-)technology is available is 19 (383) ﬂrms. To see that the equilibrium fails
t oe x i s tn o t et h a tƒ S(1;19) = :517 > ƒL(0;19) = :423 and that ƒS(2;20) = :004 < ƒL(1;20) = :038.
13an incentive to switch to the S technology. The only remaining candidate equilibrium
is one with ’only S-type ﬂrms are active’. Above C this cannot be an equilibrium as
well. The result is non-existence.
Note that locus A rather than some extension of locus C limits the non-existence
range for a • (n¡m+1)c,i . e .f o ra • 4 in the case of one large ﬂrm. The reason is the
following: In a situation where only small ﬂrms are active, a large ﬂrm could always
proﬂtably enter for values of s above locus A. All small ﬂrms would stop producing
as prices would be below their marginal costs. Therefore, the L-ﬂrm could break even.
A large ﬂrm will be active even though switching from the S-technology to the L-
technology were not proﬂtable. The latter result is due to the integer constraint which
implies positive proﬂts of the S-type incumbents in a free entry equilibrium.
The above argument for non-existence applies to the left of locus V1 (i.e., the area
indicated by the left arrow originating at NE). The (dashed) locus V1 describes the
vectors (a;s) at which a small ﬂrm becomes viable, given that one („ n) large ﬂrm(s)
is(are) active. Thus, to the right of this line ’one large ﬂrm is active’ is no longer a
candidate equilibrium. Similarly, locus V2 describes the vectors (a;s)a tw h i c ht w o
small ﬂrms become viable. Both between the loci V1 and V2 and to the right of V2
n o n - e x i s t e n c ea r i s e s . T h er e s p e c t i v ea r e a sa r ei n d i c a t e db yt h ec e n t e ra n dt h er i g h t
arrow. They apply below the loci s1;1 and s1;2, respectively. Along s1;1 (s1;2)aﬂ r m
is indiﬁerent between the S and the L-technology given that one (two) small rival(s)
is (are) active. The non-existence area indicated by the right arrow is so small that
it is hardly visible. For parameter values where three or more small ﬂrms were viable
non-existence cannot arise. Similarly, the constraint provided by locus V1 is binding
for small values of „ n only, namely for the case of one to four large ﬂrms. Figure 2 omits
the non-existence areas to the right of the (dashed) locus V1 for the cases in which two
to four large ﬂrms are active, the respective areas would hardly be visible. For the
purpose of the example it is su–cient to know that non-existence also arises in a small
part of the area made up by V1;s 1,a n dB.L o c u sB is the only part of Figure 2 which
14is not yet explained. I explain the construction of this locus by using Figure 4.
Figure 4 about here
Figure 4 provides another detail of Figure 2. It depicts the area of non-existence
for the case where the candidate equilibrium is one with four large ﬂrms. Two things
need to be explained, the array of curves drawn in grey and locus B. The grey lines
are conditions which are analogous to s1.T h e ys o l v et h ee q u a t i o nƒ S(m; „ n+m¡1) =
ƒL(m ¡ 1; „ n + m ¡ 1). For m = 1, one obtains the condition determining s1 (see
equation 12). For m =2 ,t h ec u r v en e x tt ol o c u ss1 applies. Using the notation of
Figure 3, this curve could be denoted as s1;1. Between this curve and s1 non-existence
arises because the pivotal ﬂrm would switch to the S-technology if all ﬂrms use the
L-technology but would switch back to the L-technology if entry occurs due to the
ﬂrst switch. Below the m = 2 locus entry of a single S-entrant would not induce a
switch by the pivotal ﬂrm to the L-technology. However, the switch occurs if a second
S-ﬂrm would enter. Analogous reasoning holds for the other curves (m =3 ;4;:::, i.e.,
s1;2;s 1;3;:::). The number of small entrants is always incremented by one. The adjacent
pairs of these curves give the non-existence area for diﬁerent conﬂgurations with „ n¡1
large ﬂrms and m ¡ 1 small ﬂrms. These areas are bounded at the left by locus A.
For values of s below locus A,„ n large ﬂrms are not viable. Thus, the switch to the
L-technology, which causes non-existence, can no longer occur. Locus B is the lower
envelope of the array of grey curves. It connects the points where the adjacent pairs
of curves intersect.10;11
A ﬂnal condition for non-existence to arise concerns the viability of potential en-
trants once a large incumbent switches to the small-scale technology. As mentioned
above, non-existence requires that entry occurs if an incumbent switches. The impor-
tance of the viability condition becomes apparent in the case of a candidate equilibrium
10As shown in the appendix, non-existence arises only to the left of the intersections.
11The maximum number of m I consider in the construction of B is the free entry number of small
ﬂrms if only the S-technology were available. This procedure yields an upper bound for the range in
which an equilibrium does not exist. See also the next paragraph.
15with 20 large ﬂrms. While a triangle (s1;A;B) exists for this case, non-existence does
not arise because neither a small nor a large entrant would be viable if the pivotal ﬂrm
were to switch to the S-technology. This requirement for non-existence is not satisﬂed
in part of the triangle with 19 large ﬂrms as well. For smaller numbers of large ﬂrms the
’triangles’ are a good approximation for the actual non-existence area. For instance, in
the case underlying Figure 4, 16 small ﬂrms would at least be viable if three large ﬂrms
were active. The respective grey curves (e.g.,s1;13) are very close to the intersection of
locus A and locus B. At least in Figure 2, the diﬁerence between the approximation
and the actual non-existence area would not be visible.
The above example indicates two things. First, non-existence does not seem to
arise for large values of vertical market size a. Indeed, Proposition 3 below shows
that, given cost parameters, a threshold value a⁄ exists such that non-existence cannot
occur for a>a ⁄. Second, it demonstrates that the area where non-existence occurs
is ’small’. This holds even in a case where, due to a large diﬁerence between fS and
fL, non-existence may arise for candidate equilibria with as many as 19 large ﬂrms.
That is, even though a⁄ is ’large’, non-existence cannot occur in a number of intervals
[a1;a 2[, where a2 <a ⁄. The area of the non-existence triangles is small in general.
Exceptions are the triangles for the cases with a small number of large ﬂrms in the
candidate equilibrium. If this number is ﬂve or smaller than ﬂve, such intervals no
longer exist and the area of the triangles becomes ’large’. In this sense, non-existence
is a small number problem.
Turning back to the general case I show now that an equilibrium of the whole
game always exists in markets of a su–ciently large vertical size. What is ’su–cient’ is
shown below. The relevance of the parameter a should be clear from the discussion of
Proposition 1. We know that a symmetric equilibrium does not exist once horizontal
market size s is such that we are slightly above the knife-edge case TL = TS.I ti sn a t u r a l
to ask whether non-existence may also arise for arbitrary values of a. Proposition 3
s h o w st h a tt h i si sn o tt h ec a s e .
16Proposition 3 Given the cost parameters of the model, an a⁄ exists such that for all
a>a ⁄ an equilibrium of the two-stage game exists.
Proof see Appendix.
It is instructive to look at how the proof proceeds.12 The proof starts with the
necessary conditions for a candidate equilibrium (m;n) not to be an equilibrium of
the game (equations (30) and (31)). The conditions yield a maximum value for a
denoted as „ a such that non-existence can arise. I then show that for su–ciently large
n, n ﬂrms are not viable, given the market size vector ensuring non-existence. This is a
contradiction to the assumption that the conﬂguration is a candidate equilibrium. This
result yields an intuitive explanation as well. Remember that changes in a leave the
relative proﬂtability of the two technologies unaﬁected. Therefore, one would expect
that an increase in the number of large ﬂrms changes the condition for switching to
the small technology, loosely speaking, in a proportional way. Increases in the number
of ﬂrms, however, imply that the market becomes more competitive in the sense that
price-cost margins decrease. Thus, a given change in the number of ﬂrms requires a
more than proportional increase in market size in order for the larger number of ﬂrms
to be viable.13 As a result, the conditions for non-existence to arise eventually cease
to hold as the number of (large) ﬂrms increases.
It is possible to explicitly determine the maximum number n⁄ of L-type ﬂrms for
which non-existence may arise. It can be shown that n⁄ is the (positive) root of the
equation14
(1 + 4n +1 2n2 +2 0n3 +2 4n4 +1 6n5 +4n6) fS
¡(1 + 8n +2 0n2 +1 6n3 +4n4) fL =0 : (13)
12The proof follows the construction of the non-existence areas in Figures 2 and 4 closely. Unfortu-
nately, this makes the proof quite tedious.
13Actually, „ a, capturing the non-existence condition, is strictly concave in the number of large ﬂrms
(see equation (34)), whereas the zero-proﬂt condition is linear in n.
14The equation derives from setting ƒL(0;n) as deﬂned in equation (35) in the Appendix equal to
0.
17Two points deriving from equation (13) are worth being mentioned. First, n⁄ depends
only on the ratio fL=fS.S e c o n d , n⁄ is of order
q
fL=fS. n⁄ may well grow without
bound. However, this requires quite a large diﬁerence between the two technologies
in terms of their respective ﬂxed costs. Empirically, a ratio of fL=fS … 400 as in the
above example seems to be quite a large number. And even in this case, n⁄ is only
20. The reason why n⁄ increases with fL=fS seems to be the following: switching
technologies seems to be more proﬂtable when the diﬁerences between technologies are
large. Note that this is not a ceteris paribus statement. The switch can only occur in
a neighborhood of the knife-edge case. That is, large diﬁerences in ﬂxed costs require
either large diﬁerences in marginal costs or a large horizontal market size s.
Given n⁄, we can immediately derive a⁄. Substituting n⁄ in equation (34) and







2( ¡1+n⁄ + n⁄2)
!
: (14)
For n⁄ ‚ 2, a⁄ is smaller than c(
q
fL=fS + 2). Similar to the condition for D in
Proposition 1, we obtain an easy check for the question whether an equilibrium exists.
The way in which a⁄ depends on c, the diﬁerence in marginal costs, is straightforward.
If the diﬁerence is large, a must be large in order for small ﬂrms to be viable at all.
T h es a m ea r g u m e n ta p p l i e sf o rl a r g ev a l u e so fn⁄. In order for a single small ﬂrm to
produce a positive amount of output in the case of n⁄ L-type rivals, a must be greater
than cn⁄ (see equation (4)).
5.2 Asymmetric and multiple equilibria
In this subsection I discuss both under what conditions ﬂrms employing diﬁerent tech-
nologies may co-exist in equilibrium and the circumstances which give rise to the ex-
istence of multiple equilibria. It turns out that a rather intuitive characterization
is possible based on the above example. As noted above, the empirical importance
of asymmetric equilibria, i.e. of equilibria in which ﬂrms of diﬁerent size are active,
stems from the well established empirical ﬂnding that ﬂrm sizes diﬁer greatly within
18industries (see, e.g., Sutton, 1998 and Cabral and Mata, 2001). My model stresses the
importance of both lumpy technology and market size in the explanation of these facts.
In what follows I describe the market size vectors for which asymmetric and multiple
equilibria arise, given cost parameters.
From the above discussion of Figures 2, 3, and 4 it is clear that locus V1 will be
pivotal in determining the respective range of co-existence. To the right of V1 as m a l l
ﬂrm is viable even if the maximum feasible number of large ﬂrms is active. Even though
Figure 2 draws the respective dashed lines only for the cases of one to four large ﬂrms,
similar lines exist for the other non-existence areas in Figure 2 as well. Actually, in the
example a small ﬂrm may be viable for as large values of a as 1900, given the number of
large ﬂrms is equal to the free entry number of large ﬂrms in a situation with only large
ﬂrms. The latter number is greater than 900.15 It is now straightforward to determine
areas in which asymmetric equilibria must exist. If we were to draw locus V1 for all
the diﬁerent numbers of large ﬂrms considered in Figure 2, and if we extend that up
to the locus where a further large ﬂrm becomes viable (extend locus A to obtain that
condition), we obtain an area with an asymmetric equilibrium certainly as long as we
are above locus C.16
The obvious question to address now is whether the respective asymmetric equilibria
are unique. We know that above locus s1 (to be exact, above locus s1;1 in the notation
used in Figure 3), an equilibrium exists with the maximum feasible number of L-type
ﬂrms and one (or a ’few’) small ﬂrms. However, other equilibria may exist as well
as long as the market size vector (a;s)i sc l o s et os1. To see this, consider Figure
4. Note that s1;13 (i.e., the grey line closest to the intersection of A and B)i sm u c h
￿atter than s1. Extending this line across locus V1, we see that for the area between
s1 and the (extended) grey line the following holds. The pivotal ﬂrm would choose
the L-technology if only one (or a few) small ﬂrms were active. This yields the above
15For (a;s)=( 1 9 4 1 :91;464:129) an equilibrium with one small ﬂrm and 922 large ﬂrms exists.
16This statement does not hold, of course, for vectors from the non-existence area.
19described equilibrium with the maximum number of large ﬂrms. If, however, 15 or
more small ﬂrms are active, the pivotal ﬂrm chooses the S-technology. In the resulting
equilibrium, the number of large ﬂrms is one short of the maximum number. This
argument applies even for vectors for which a small ﬂrm would not be viable, i.e., for
vectors to the left of V1. To see this, consider the vector (a;s)=( 1 4 :675;491:364).
In this case, two equilibria exist: (m;n)=( 0 ;6) and (m;n)=( 2 0 ;25). The ﬂrst
equilibrium implies that a small ﬂrm is not viable, given the maximum number of large
ﬂrms is active. That is, we are to the left of V1. Obviously, we are also below one of
the above mentioned (extended) grey lines (below what might be called s1;20 using the
notation of Figure 3).
Given the above argument and the shape of locus B as well as the grey lines in
Figure 4, it is now straightforward to provide an upper bound „ s with the following
property. For values of horizontal market size greater than „ s, the resulting equilibria
are unique. To construct „ s, consider Figure 4 and note that the slope of locus B close
to the intersection with A is always negative, although the curve is quite ￿at. If the
number of small ﬂrms is quite large, the locus along which the pivotal ﬂrm is indiﬁerent
between the two technologies is only slightly negatively inclined. To be sure that the
pivotal ﬂrm chooses the L-technology it is su–cient to draw a horizontal line through
the maximum of locus B in terms of s. Alternatively, one may join the intersections of
loci A and B to obtain an upper bound for the parameters underlying Figure 2. The
resulting curve is nearly a straight, horizontal line with a value of s of about 511.
Having derived an upper bound for multiple equilibria to arise, the next step consists
of the derivation of a lower bound s. Proposition 1 has shown that the value of s for
which TS = TL holds is the obvious candidate. In the example the respective value of s
is 463.129. This value seems to be the greatest lower bound, i.e. s =4 6 3 :129. It is easy
to ﬂnd examples for values slightly greater than s for which multiple equilibria arise.17
17I have calculated the equilibria for s +1a n da ranging from 8 to 60. In each case multiple
equilibria arise. Take, for example, (a;s)=( 2 0 ;464:129). The equilibrium conﬂgurations are in this
case: (m;n)=f(30;37);(50;56);(71;76);(91;95);(111;114);(131;133);(152;153);(172;172)g.M u l t i -
20As far as the existence of symmetric equilibria is concerned, note that below locus C
a symmetric equilibrium exists, in which only small ﬂrms are active. Of course, the
respective equilibrium is not unique as long as s>s .L o c u sC converges to s for large
a.
The above discussion shows that there are two rather diﬁerent conﬂgurations under
which an asymmetric equilibrium arises. First, a range in which the resulting asym-
metric equilibrium is unique. Second, an area in which multiple equilibria exist. In the
latter case, at least one of the equilibria is asymmetric. The economic reason as to why
these diﬁerent types arise are also diﬁerent. The unique equilibria arise largely due to
indivisibilities of technology; entry of the more ’e–cient’ type of ﬂrm is not possible,
as it could take place only on a large scale. On the other hand, a small ﬂrm may be
able to enter the market even though its average costs are higher. Small-scale entry is
possible even in the case of a small residual demand.
Multiple equilibria arise only if the ﬂrms are not too diﬁerent in terms of aver-
age costs. The upper bound „ s determines this maximum diﬁerence. Below „ s the
L-technology is not su–ciently superior in order to be always the ﬂrst choice in the
following sense. Suppose we are in a situation with less than the maximum feasible
number of large ﬂrms and with a number of small ﬂrms which is just viable given the
number of large ﬂrms. For s>„ s it is always proﬂtable for a small ﬂrm to switch
to the large-scale technology. Below „ s this does not hold. Between „ s and s the two
technologies exhibit similar average costs. This makes it possible to produce diﬁerent
equilibria by replacing, for instance, one large ﬂrm by the number of small ﬂrms, which
is su–cient to produce approximately the same output. The example mentioned in
footnote 17 produces such a pattern. One large ﬂrm can be replaced by about 20 small
ﬂrms. Note that the equilibrium output of a large ﬂrm is about 977, small ﬂrms pro-
duce about one twentieth, namely about 49 units of output. This result is very much
in vein of Davis (1999) who provides conditions under which market output is uniquely
ple equilibria can also be found for s + :5 even for as small a number of a as 12.
21determined within the set of (multiple) equilibria.
A ﬂnal point related to multiple equilibria, but also to my model of technology
choice in general, concerns the relation between market concentration and market
power, respectively, and performance. The multiple equilibria exhibit nearly identi-
cal performance in terms equilibrium prices. Prices typically diﬁer by less than a
tenth of a percentage point. However, concentration ratios and price-cost margins
vary greatly. More generally, if an industry experiences a drastic restructuring due to
increases in horizontal market size s, the new equilbrium is typically one with much
higher concentration and with lower prices.
6 Conclusions
Once one takes entry and technology choice into account, (two-stage) Cournot games
allow for a wide range of outcomes. Apart from a unique equilibrium with symmetric
ﬂrms, co-existence of diﬁerent types of ﬂrms and non-uniqueness of equilibrium may
result for diﬁerent parameter values. An outcome may also be non-existence even
though the underlying game is one with linear demand and constant marginal costs.
The article characterizes the parameter values for which the various outcomes result
and evaluates their respective importance. The full characterization of the equilib-
rium outcomes in this article allows applied papers focussing on technology choice to
evaluate the importance of diﬁerent equilibrium conﬂgurations without performing a
complete analysis on their own. An example of such an application is Elberfeld, G˜ otz,
and St˜ ahler (2002). Technology choice enters their model in the shape of whether
production should take place domestically or whether ﬂrms should choose a multina-
tional production mode. The formal structure of the problem of vertical foreign direct
investment Elberfeld, G˜ otz, and St˜ ahler consider is the same as in my model.
As regards the importance of the diﬁerent outcomes, the article has shown that
non-existence does not occur if vertical market size and the number of ﬂrms is large.
Existence problems become important if the market supports only a few large ﬂrms.
22The conclusion from this result for the duopoly cases often considered in the literature
is the following: Entry should explicitly be taken into account in the respective models.
This would ensure that the claimed equilibria can really result from underlying fully
speciﬂed games.
Compared to non-existence, asymmetric equilibria are much more important in the
sense that they apply for a larger set of parameter values. The interesting thing about
the equilibria with co-existence of diﬁerent ﬂrm types is that it provides an endogenous
explanation of a stylized fact, namely that ﬂrms in an industry often diﬁer with respect
to their size. This explanation is based purely on indivisibilities in technology choice
and on market size.
The combination of indivisibilities and of technology choice in my model yields two
further conclusions. The ﬂrst regards the integer constraint. In a case in which ﬂrms are
large compared to the market size, lumpy technology may yield substantial proﬂts due
to the integer constraint (see Lambson, 1987). Once one allows for technology choice,
the problem of excess proﬂts is partly mitigated by the possibility of small-scale entry,
even if the small-scale technology is lumpy as well. The second conclusion concerns
the relation between market structure and performance. The discussion of multiple
equilibria has shown that the various equilibrium conﬂgurations may diﬁer greatly
in market structure parameters like the number of ﬂrms and industry concentration.
These diﬁerences map into diﬁerences in conduct parameters like price-cost margin in
an intuitive and expected way. However, large variations in price-cost margins among
industries, for instance, do not imply that these industries diﬁer in performance. On the
contrary, the article has shown that rather diﬁerent industry structures are compatible
with nearly identical equilibrium outcomes in terms of prices. Yet another example
that policy prescriptions based on determinants of the industry structure only may be
quite misleading.
237 Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 1
Case 1: TL <T S.
First, I show that a conﬂguration in which S-ﬂrms are active, i.e., m>0, cannot
be an equilibrium. Entry with the L-technology would be proﬂtable in this case. To
see this note that m>0r e q u i r e sƒ S(m;n) ‚ 0. Using (6), this inequality can be
rearranged to yield











Proﬂtable entry of an L-ﬂrm requires ƒL(m;n +1 )‚ 0. Similar to the above














From equation (16) we know that the ﬂrst term of (18) is smaller than 1=TS. Therefore,




















This inequality is certainly satisﬂed as the l.h.s. is smaller than 1, while the r.h.s
consists of the deﬂnition of D which by assumption is greater than 2. This proves that
24the S technology cannot be used in equilibrium. Additional entry of L-ﬂrms would
occur.
The second step of the proof shows that a ﬂrm in a candidate equilibrium with only
L- t y p eﬂ r m sd o e sn o th a v ea ni n c e n t i v et os w i t c ht ot h eS-technology. In formal terms
a su–cient condition for such a switch not to be proﬂtable is ƒS(1;n ⁄) < 0. Here,
n⁄ is deﬂned as the largest integer such that ƒL(0;n) ‚ 0. To prove that switching is
unproﬂtable I calculate the (real) numbers „ n and ^ n, respectively, for which ƒS(1;n)=0











respectively. To show that ƒL(1;n ⁄) < 0 it is su–cient that ^ n>„ n +1 . N o t et h a t


















This inequality clearly holds. The l.h.s equals D and is therefore by assumption greater
than 2. The expression c=TS is smaller than 1. This proves the proposition as concerns
the case TL <T S.
Case 2: TS • TL. First, I show that the L-technology cannot be an equilibrium
choice. It is always optimal for a large ﬂrm to switch to the S-technology, irrespective
of what the number of large ﬂrms is, if
ƒS(~ m(i)+1 ; ~ m(i)+i) ¡ ƒL(~ m(i); ~ m(i)+i) > 0: (25)
Here i is an arbitrary number of large ﬂrms (of course smaller than the maximum
feasible number). ~ m(i) is the maximum viable number of small ﬂrms, given there are
25i large ﬂrms, i.e., it is determined by the condition ƒS(~ m(i); ~ m(i)+i)=0 .U s i n gt h e
condition TL = TS tedious calculations yield that the l.h.s. of (25) equals
cfS(2a ¡ c ¡ 2ci)=(a ¡ c ¡ ci)
2: (26)
This expression must be positive if small ﬂrms are to be viable at all. Thus, deviation
from the L-technology is always proﬂtable.
It remains to be shown that an S-ﬂrm does not have an incentive to switch to the





⁄) > 0: (27)
It turns out that the resulting expression is positive both if the integer constraint is
taken into account and if it is neglected. Once one employs the condition TL = TS to
substitute for fL, one eventually obtains in the latter case




(a ¡ c)2 ; (28)
which is clearly positive. Condition (27) is also positive if evaluated at n⁄ ¡ 1t h u s
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Omitting the term 2fS in the term in brackets in the numerator, the remaining ex-
pression is positive once n⁄ > 1:5. Thus one obtains that the whole term is positive.18
Only S-type ﬂrms are active is the unique equilibrium if TL • TS.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof proceeds in several steps.
First, I derive necessary conditions for the non-existence of equilibrium. Suppose
that the conﬂguration (m¡1;n) constitutes a candidate equilibrium. Necessary condi-
tions for non-existence are that conﬂgurations (m¡1;n)a n d( m;n)d onot constitute
18For brevity, it is omitted to show that the derivative of condition (27) with respect to n⁄ is
monotonous, proving that the the condition must be satisﬂed for the actual equilibrium number
which lies in the interval [n⁄ ¡ 1;n ⁄]
26an equilibrium. Thus, conditions
ƒS(m;n) ‚ ƒL(m ¡ 1;n) (30)
and
maxfƒS(m +1 ;n+1 ) ;0g•ƒL(m;n +1 ) ; (31)
where m =1 ;:::;n. must hold. Condition (30) implies that an L-ﬂrm would deviate
to the S-technology, thus (m ¡ 1;n) cannot be an equilibrium. By condition (31)
the switch would induce entry of an L-ﬂrm, thus (m;n)c a n n o tb ea ne q u i l i b r i u m .
Condition (31) implies also that (m +1 ;n+ 1) cannot be an equilibrium.
Second, I show that a maximum value of „ a exists such that the necessary conditions
for non-existence, i.e., conditions (30) and (31), can be satisﬂed simultaneously, given
the number of ﬂrms. From conditions (30) and (31) we can derive the values of s (s1 and
s2) such that both conditions are satisﬂed with equality. In terms of Figure 4, s1 and s2
are two adjacent grey curves. In the case of (31), I drop the 0 and take ƒS(m+1;n+1)
as the term on the left hand side. This matters only if ƒS(m +1 ;n+1 )< 0. In this
case the non-existence range is a subset of the set captured by the conditions. Solving
(30) and (31) for s yields
s1 ·
(1 + n)
2 (fL ¡ fS)




2 (fL ¡ fS)
c (1 + n)( 2a ¡ c(n ¡ 2m +1 ) )
: (33)
(30) and (31) are satisﬂed for values of s such that s2 <s<s 1. This follows from the
fact that
@ƒL/@s > @ƒS/@s:
Calculating the value of a such that s1 = s2 we obtain
„ a · 2c + c(n ¡ m)+
c (3 + 2n)
2( ¡1+n + n2)
: (34)
27In terms of Figure 4, the values of „ a f o rd i ﬁ e r e n tv a l u e so fm constitute locus B.I t
is straightforward to show that the derivative of s1 with respect to a evaluated at „ a is
greater in absolute terms than the respective derivative of s2.T h u s ,s2 <s 1 requires
a<„ a. Therefore, „ a is the maximum value such that conditions (30) and (31) can
be satisﬂed simultaneously. Note two things about the relation between „ a and m,t h e
number of small ﬂrms, deriving from (34). First, for given n,„ a assumes a maximum for
m = 1, i.e., in a candidate equilibrium with only large ﬂrms, in which the pivotal ﬂrm
may switch from the L-technology to the S-technology. Second, for a given number of
large ﬂrms, i.e. n ¡ m, the case without small ﬂrms again yields the maximum value
of „ a. As a consequence of these two properties it is su–cient to consider non-existence
for candidate equilibria with only large ﬂrms active. Thus, in what follows the analysis
assumes m =1 .
Third, I show that a number of large ﬂrms n⁄ exist such that for n>n ⁄ the necessary
conditions for non-existence, i.e., (30) and (31), cannot be satisﬂed simultaneously. The
reason is that, starting from the values of „ a and s1 associated with n,a nn exists such
that n ﬂrms are not viable given the underlying values of a and n. To see this, calculate
the proﬂts of L-ﬂrms in the candidate equilibrium (0;n)i fa =„ a and s = s1(„ a). One
obtains
ƒL(0;n)=
(1 + 4n +2n2)
2 (fL ¡ fS)
4n(1 + n)
3 (¡1+n + n2)
¡ fL (35)
This expression is decreasing in n. Therefore, an n⁄ must exist such that all ﬂrms’
proﬂts are negative for all n ‚ n⁄. Thus, the candidate equilibrium (0;n)w i t hn ‚ n⁄
requires a market size vector (a;s) such that either a>„ a or, in the case of a<„ a,t h a t
s>s 1(a). The latter statement follows from the fact that proﬂts are an increasing
function of a if we use s = s1(a) .T h er e s p e c t i v ep r o ﬂ t sr e a d
ƒL(0;n)=
a2 (fL ¡ fS)
2acn¡ c2 n2 ¡ fL: (36)
It is straightforward to show that the derivative of this expression with respect to a is
positive. Therefore, it is proved that non-existence cannot occur for a number of large
28ﬂrms greater than n⁄.V a l u e s o f a and s satisfying the relevant necessary conditions
for non-existence do not support the respective candidate equilibrium.
Finally, a⁄, the threshold value of a which ensures existence is calculated. Substi-
tuting n⁄ into equation (34) and using m = 1 yields the respective value (see equation
(14) in the main text). It follows from the above reasoning that conditions (30) and
(31) cannot be satisﬂed simultaneously for a>a ⁄. Therefore, non-existence cannot
occur for a>a ⁄. This completes the proof. 2
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Figure 1: Condition for the existence of a unique and symmetric equilibrium
(TS >T L).















Figure 2: Regions of non-existence of an equilibrium















Figure 3: Regions of non-existence of an equilibrium (detail): Candidate equilibria
with one or two large ﬂrms















Figure 4: Non-existence of an equilibrium (detail): Candidate equilibrium with four
large ﬂrms
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